Kashmir : A Political Game-1930-1960(Part-2):History, Conflict, India, Pakistan, Kashmiris, Separatist, Information War, Possible Solution

1 August: Mahatma Gandhi visits the Maharaja; impresses upon him the need to be prompt in deciding on the State's accession. The Gilgit Agency is transferred by the British to the Maharaja.

11 August: Maharaja dismisses Prime Minister Ram Chandra Kak and replaces him with the retired Major Janak Singh.

11–13 August: Partition violence erupts in Sialkot, driving the surviving Hindus and Sikhs to Jammu.

14–15 August: Independence and Partition of British India into India and Pakistan. Kashmir signs Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. India requests further discussions for a Standstill agreement.

18 August: In one of the worst train massacres of Partition, Lohars and 'Kashmiris' of Nizamabad kill all the Hindu and Sikh passengers of Wazirabad-Jammu train. http://www.dawn.com/news/668382/excerpt-stories-of-an-unacknowledged-massacre

Kashmir: History (August 1947 ) :JAMMU ROITS IN 1947: The Reason 

The worst violence occurred in Rawalpindi division where serious rioting began during the first week of March. The raiders, some of whom were from the North West Frontier Province, but also included local Punjabis not only burned and looted many non-Muslim villages in the region but also looted and gutted ‘Murree hill stations’ which were used by British troops during the hot weather.

 A particular facture of the March violence was ‘the genocidal aspect’ of violence. There was a general agreement that these attacks on Hindus and Sikhs were ‘carefully planned and carried out’ and reportedly led by some retired Muslim army officers.

 According to an official estimate, by mid-March more than five thousand Hindus and Sikhs were killed in these raids, and more than fifty thousand took shelter in the hurriedly established camps of Wah Attock and Kala Rawalpindi. The gravity of growing tension can be gauged by a fact that the special armoured trucks and tanks were sent to Rawalpindi and  to defuse the situation. In the aftermath of the Rawalpindi killings, Hindus and Sikhs of the Punjab demanded the division of the province along with the division of India.

In such a climate of fear and uncertainty, by April 1947, non-Muslims from the violence in the Rawalpindi division were arriving in other parts of the Punjab and the Kashmir region, expecting to return after the violence ceased.

With in a week of the killings, ‘a large flock’ of the Hindus and Sikhs from Rawalpindi division started migrating to neighbouring Kashmir region. The embittered Sikh and Hindu refugees’ tales of violence raised animosities wherever they settled. They planned revenge and produced and circulated wildly inflammatory pamphlets and brochures. Their horrified tales of the Muslim perpetration circulated widespread and served as an occasion to launch a reign of terror on the Jammu Muslim population. Shortly flight and violence went hand in hand. Violence Jammu was increasingly locked into an all-India pattern, as killings in one part of the country were justified as retribution for violence in another part. Jammu’s Muslims were to pay a heavy price in August-October 1947 for the early disturbances in the West Punjab.

Pakistan made various efforts to persuade the Maharaja of Kashmir to join Pakistan. In July 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah is believed to have written to the Maharaja promising "every sort of favourable treatment," followed by Muslim League leaders lobbying with the Prime Minister of the Kashmir State. Faced with the Maharaja's indecision, the Muslim League agents clandestinely worked in Poonch to encourage the local Muslims to revolt Later in September.

Pakistan made various efforts to persuade the Maharaja of Kashmir to join Pakistan. In July 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah is believed to have written to the Maharaja promising "every sort of favourable treatment," followed by Muslim League leaders lobbying with the Prime Minister of the Kashmir State. Faced with the Maharaja's indecision, the Muslim League agents clandestinely worked in Poonch to encourage the local Muslims to revolt Later in September.

20 August: Pakistan Army formulates `Operation Gulmarg' to organise a tribal invasion of Kashmir.

23 August: Rebels under the command of Sardar Abdul Qayyum fire on the State Forces at Bagh. 

Kashmir: History (September 1947 ) 

Before Partition, he was instrumental in massacring fellow Pashtuns at the behest of the British Raj in the 1937-38 operation in Pashtun Tribal areas. During that time, he built up his networks within the local tribes, particularly with the Mehsuds of South Waziristan – a seed that would be used for a deadly harvest later. Just months after Partition, he was charged with leading the “Jihad” in Kashmir – a tragic operation that saw an indiscriminate and brutal massacre of Kashmir’s indigenous Muslim and Hindu partition. In 1948, the same General Akbar lead the annexation of the State of Kalat that became Balochistan.

At the time of Independence, Akbar Khan was a member of the sub-committee involved in partitioning the armed forces between India and Pakistan. Less than two months after Independence, fighting started in Kashmir, the Indian Army landed in Srinagar and confronted the Pathan tribesmen who were advancing towards the valley. Akbar Khan, who was then a Brigadier, assumed command of the regulars and irregulars fighting against the Indian forces and was given the code name “General Tariq”.

Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan was the first prime minister and a founding    father of Pakistan. It has been alleged that the Afghan and US governments were involved in his assassination, although this claim has not merited any substantial evidence.

Liaquat Ali Khan was the one to bring for the first time religion into politics. From 1947 until 1956,  Pakistan as referred to as the Dominion of Pakistan. After the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, His alliance with the mullahs produced the ‘Objectives Resolution’, which declared Pakistan to be an ‘Islamic state' and It became Islamic republic of Pakistan. Common perception holds Zia or Bhutto responsible for mixing religion and politics, but it was Liaquat Ali Khan under whose leadership mullahs were given entry into politics and the right to decide the fate of the nation.

4 September: Henry Lawrence Scott informs the Maharaja that 400 armed Muslims infiltrated from Kahuta into the state to terrorize the Hindu and Sikh minorities. On the same day, Civil & Military Gazette reported that there was an `uprising' in the Poonch area.

9 September: Pakistan cuts off supplies of petrol, sugar, salt and kerosene and stops trade in timber, fruits, fur and carpets in violation of the standstill agreement.

12 September: Liaquat Ali Khan approves the plan for "Armed Revolt inside Kashmir" prepared by Colonel Akbar Khan and another plan prepared by Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan. Khurshid Anwar of Muslim League National Guard is dispatched to the Frontier to mobilise the tribals for an attack.

13 September: Pakistan accepts the accession of the Junagadh State.

13-18 September: Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan visits Kashmir and accepts the Maharaja's invitation to be the Prime Minister of the state.

Apart from that, the Government of Pakistan sent a junior army officer ASB Shah to seek accession of the State to Pakistan. Justice Muhammad Yusuf Saraf in his book commented:

‘A junior officer ……………………… To have expected of him to deliver the goods in a situation which was being handled on the Indian side by intellectual giants like Mehr Chand Mahajan, VP Menon and Gopal Swami Ayyanger, was to have well asked for the moon.’

Major Shah was a son – in – law of one of the important Secretaries of the Pakistan Government. He reached Srinagar and started negotiations in a typical military style. Mehr Chand Mahjan in his book, ‘Looking Back’ noted that, Major Shah:

‘Was in Srinagar with a whip in one hand and a letter of accession in the other. He had been trying to persuade General Janak Singh and Mr Batra to advise the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan………….He was keen to have assurance of State’s accession to Pakistan or in alternative, a negative assurance that I would not advise the Maharajah to accede to India. I told him that I could not give any positive reply without discussing the matter with my Cabinet and the leading men of the State and then with His Highness and that it would take some time. But he was not prepared to wait. When I found out that he had come there almost with an ultimatum, I said, “If you raise the blockade and allow food, clothes and petrol to enter the State I will discuss the matter in detail with you”. He agreed to persuade Mr Jinnah to remove the blockade and sent a telegram to him at Lahore, but got no favourable reply. He then saw me again and said, “Mr Jinnah invites you to Lahore. Go there and have a talk with him”.

Mahjan was an experienced Statesman and fully understood why he was invited to Lahore. In any case, he had no desire to accede to Pakistan; he further wrote: ‘I was in no mood to present myself at Mr Jinnah’s Darbar, fall in Pakistani hands and meet my doom. I declined the invitation, as the object was to coerce me in to securing the State’s accession to Pakistan. When Major Shah failed in his efforts, he sweetly departed, but with a parting shot, declaring that His Highness would soon come to grief and realise his folly. I retorted bluntly that the result of such action on the part of Pakistan would be to throw the State in the lap of India, no matter what the result. I assured him that we could not be coerced by such tactics to sign an agreement of accession of the State to Pakistan.’

Mahjan was an experienced Statesman and fully understood why he was invited to Lahore. In any case, he had no desire to accede to Pakistan; he further wrote: ‘I was in no mood to present myself at Mr Jinnah’s Darbar, fall in Pakistani hands and meet my doom. I declined the invitation, as the object was to coerce me in to securing the State’s accession to Pakistan. When Major Shah failed in his efforts, he sweetly departed, but with a parting shot, declaring that His Highness would soon come to grief and realise his folly. I retorted bluntly that the result of such action on the part of Pakistan would be to throw the State in the lap of India, no matter what the result. I assured him that we could not be coerced by such tactics to sign an agreement of accession of the State to Pakistan.’

Kashmir: History (October  1947 ) 

Tribal invasion of Kashmir started on 22 October 1947, an outcome of collaboration between Pakistan army, Pakistan Muslim League and Muslim Conference. Muslim Conference not only invited the tribal attack but also actively joined the raiders. Reward for this collaboration was that they were appointed rulers of this region known as Pakistan occupied Kashmir; they and their political masters in Pakistan kept on feeding lies to people to strengthen the impression that the ‘tribesmen’ were ‘liberators’, and they came to Kashmir to fulfil their religious obligation. The Tribal Invasion was a contentious and significant action, because of its serious consequences; and because it clearly violated the Standstill Agreement concluded between Pakistan and the Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir. 

A large number of tribals from Pakistan attacked Kashmir under the code name “Operation Gulmarg” to seize Kashmir. The invading tribals started moving along Rawalpindi-Murree-Muzaffarabad-Baramulla Road on 22 October 1947 with Pakistani army men in plain clothes. Muzaffarabad fell on 24 October 1947. They reached and captured Baramulla on 25 October. There they stayed for several days looting, raping, killing, burning, plundering and desecrating and vandalising shrines and temples instead of moving on to Srinagar 50 km away and capture its airfield which was not defended at all.

They raped and killed European nuns (only one survived) at Baramulla’s St. Joseph convent and Christian nurses at the missionary hospital. This savage orgy of loot, rape, murder and abduction of girls continued for several days. Baramulla suffered this savage orgy but saved the rest of Kashmir because the airplanes carrying the Indian troops airlifted from Delhi on the morning of 27 October could land at Srinagar airfield as the invaders were still at Baramulla.

While discussing about brutalities of the Tribal attack, Khawaja Abdul Samad said: ‘Hindus and Muslims were taking refuge in separate areas. Most of the properties that belonged to Hindus had been burnt down. Many Hindus and Sikhs had been mercilessly slaughtered and most of their bodies were still lying in their homes or on the streets. In the past two days, the tribesmen had dragged numerous bodies and thrown them into the river………..Their attack had totally devastated Muzaffarabad. The homes of Hindus and Muslims were looted, shops were plundered and all the stock loaded onto trucks. Places of worship were not spared; they entered and took whatever they considered to be of value. They tore down mandirs and desecrated masjids. In their lustful search for gold, silver and rupees they even used digging equipment to search beneath the stone floors of shops. Whatever they could find would be amassed in a collective place where tribal leaders would supervise the whole process. From here, everything would be loaded onto trucks and sent on their way to the North West Frontier Province. In Muzaffarabad and its surroundings, no Muslim home was spared from this tribal bounty-hunt.’ (Tribesmen steal from a Masjid – Mosque.)

Khawaja Abdul Samad, while discussing the loot and plunder carried out by the tribesmen who apparently came to Jammu and Kashmir for the purpose of ‘Jihad’ and to ‘liberate’ people of Jammu and Kashmir, explained how they even looted materials hidden in a Masjid.

Bourke-White debunked the myths that arms for the invasion came from tribesmen themselves, some of whom owned arms factories. She writes, “I photographed one of the larger of these munition works, belonging to the Afridi tribe. It was a rock-bound shack where five men worked. Since it took one man a month to make a rifle, it is doubtful whether all the shacks on the North-West Frontier would account for more than a fraction of the equipment with which the tribesmen poured into Kashmir during the fall of ’47. Certainly these miniature ballistics establishment would hardly explain the mortars, other heavy modern weapons, and the two aeroplanes with which the invaders were equipped”.

In an eyewitness account about the delivery of arms she writes, “In Pakistan towns close to the border, arms were handed out before daylight to tribesmen directly from the front steps of the Muslim League headquarters”.

She makes revelations e.g. ‘From Pakistan’s Capital a train loaded with medical supplies and volunteer personnel left every Wednesday morning for the Kashmir frontier, “some of the ‘Pakistan occupied Kashmir’ soldiers, taken as PoWs by the Indian army, were found to have pay books of the Pakistan Army in their pockets’.

While Bourke-White was still in Abottabad she had the opportunity to meet the nuns from St. Joseph Hospital in Baramulla who survived the carnage. They had escaped over the border at dawn. A nurse gave her a detailed description of how raiders ransacked the babies’ ward on the Convent grounds. She said, “the tribesmen began smashing up X-Ray equipment, throwing medicine bottles to the ground, ripping the statuettes of saints out of the chapel, and shooting up the place generally. Two patients were killed: an Englishman and his wife who were vacationing at the mission were murdered; and two nuns were shot”.

Maharaja's troops, heavily outnumbered and outgunned, had no chance of withstanding the attack. The Maharaja made an urgent plea to Delhi for military assistance. Upon the Governor General Lord Mountbatten's insistence, India required the Maharaja to accede before it could send troops. Accordingly, the Maharaja signed an instrument of accession on 26 October 1947, which was accepted by the Governor General the next day. While the Government of India accepted the accession, it added the provision that it would be submitted to a "reference to the people" after the state is cleared of the invaders, since "only the people, not the Maharaja, could decide where Kashmiris wanted to live." It was a provisional accession. National Conference, the largest political party in the State and headed by Sheikh Abdullah, endorsed the accession. In the words of the National Conference leader Syed Mir Qasim, India had the "legal" as well as "moral" justification to send in the army through the Maharaja's accession and the people's support of it.

1 November 1947, Mountbatten flew to Lahore for a conference with Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an `impartial reference to the will of the people'. Jinnah rejected the offer. According to A. G. Noorani Jinnah ended up squandering his leverage.

According to Jinnah, India acquired the accession through "fraud and violence." A plebiscite was unnecessary and states should accede according to their majority population. He was willing to urge Junagadh to accede to India in return for Kashmir. For a plebiscite, Jinnah demanded simultaneous troop withdrawal for he felt that 'the average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan' in the presence of Indian troops and with Sheikh Abdullah in power. When Mountbatten countered that the plebiscite could be conducted by the United Nations, Jinnah, hoping that the invasion would succeed and Pakistan might lose a plebiscite, again rejected the proposal, stating that the Governors Generals should conduct it instead. Mountbatten noted that it was untenable given his constitutional position and India did not accept Jinnah's demand of removing Sheikh Abdullah.

During the initial stages of the Kashmir conflict, Sardar Patel, India’s deputy prime minister, offered Pakistan to exchange Hyderabad Deccan for Kashmir. This fact is corroborated by a host of impeccable sources including Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Liaquat’s close confidant. The latter has described how this offer was made by the Indians in his masterly biography, The Emergence of Pakistan. Hyderabad Deccan was a gone case from day one. It was surrounded on all sides by the Indians and had a Hindu majority. Kashmir, on the other hand, was Pakistan’s jugular vein and we should have aimed to get it by hook or crook.

Kashmir: History (November 1947 )

 5–6 November: Convoys of Muslim refugees going to West Punjab attacked by armed bands supported by State troops. Very few survive. 6 November is remembered as a remembrance day in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir.

9 November: Another convoy of Muslim refugees is guarded by Indian troops, who repel the attackers killing 150 of them. No furher attacks on covoys reported after this incident.Indian Army killed attackers with out any religious bias and saved Muslims refugees going to Pakistan.

16 November: Pakistan's Political Agent Khan Mohammad Alam Khan arrives in Gilgit and takes over the administration. The provisional government is dismissed.

25 November: Massacre of 20,000 Hindus and Sikhs taking shelter at Mirpur in what is now pakistan occupied Kashmir. The day is remembered as the Mirpur day in Indian-administered Jammu.

Hardly anybody outside Baramulla has heard of Mohd Maqbool Sherwani,  or how he died and the decisive role he played in saving Srinagar from falling to Pakistani raiders Kabilis, who attacked Kashmir in the year of Independence.

Sherwani was a gutsy boy of 19 who single-handedly thwarted the advance of thousands of raiders (Kabailis) from Baramulla, thereby giving valuable time to the Indian Army to land in Srinagar and prevent an ignominious defeat.

He went around on his bike telling the Kabailis, who stormed Baramulla on October 22, 1947, not to advance towards Srinagar as the Indian Army had reached the outskirts of Baramulla.

His bluff worked. The enemy froze in its tracks for four days. By then, 1st Sikh had landed in Srinagar, on October 27,  now celebrated as Infantry Day. When the Kabailis came to know of Sherwani’s game plan, they shot him dead and crucified him. 

Kashmir: History (December 1947 )

8 December: Meeting between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, along with ministers and Lord Mountbatten. Montbatten proposes that the UN be invited to break the deadlock.

15-20 December: Indian forces losing ground. Nehru contemplates escalating the war across the international border, but decides against it.

24 December: Indian forces evicted from Jhangar by rebels. However, they repel the attack on Naushera by 27 December. India reinforces Kashmir by an additional brigade.

28 December: Mountbatten urges Nehru "to stop the fighting and to stop it as soon as possible."

31 December: India refers the Kashmir problem to the UN Security Council. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 continues into 1948.

Kashmir: History (January- April 1948 )

 1 January: UN Security Council considers the Kashmir problem.

20 January: UN Security Council passes Resolution 39 announcing a 3-member Commission to investigate the Kashmir dispute. However this does not come into fruition till May 1948.

11 February: Gilgit rebels attack Skardu. The State forces at Skardu defend it for almost six months hence. No reinforncements possible due to the Zoji La pass being closed under winter snows. The Ladakhis appeal to Nehru for help.

7 March: A small group of Indian troops brave through the Zoji La pass, reaching Leh with guns and ammunition to raise a local volunteer force.

21 April: UN Security Council passes Resolution 47 calling for a three-step process for the resolution of the dispute: Pakistani withdrawal of its nationals, India to reduce its troops to minimum level, and arrangements for a plebiscite. The UN Commisssion proposed in January is enlarged to five members under the name of UNCIP. Both India and Pakistan reject the resolution but promise to work with the Commission.

Kashmir: History (July-Novenber 1948)

 5 July: UNCIP arrives in the subcontinent. In Karachi, it was told by Pakistan that three brigades of regular Pakistan Army were oprerating in Kashmir, a "bombshell" of news according to Josef Korbel. In Delhi, the Commission was told that it needed to recognize the aggression by Pakistan. The Commission broaches the possibility of partition, considered favourably by India but rejected by Pakistan.

6 July: In response to an appeal by the UNCIP, India limits operations to clearing the land route to Leh and relieving Poonch.

13 August: UNCIP adopts its first resolution on Kashmir, fine-tuning the April resolution of the Security Council to take into account objections by both India and Pakistan. Pakistan's aggression is indirectly acknowledged by asking for its withdrawal as the first step. The resolution is accepted by India, but effectively rejected by Pakistan.

1 November : Zoji La pass recaptured by India.

15 November: Dras recaptured.

20 November: Two Indian columns link up at Poonch, relieving the pressure on the garrison.

23 November: Kargil recaptured.

The UNCIP made three visits to the subcontinent between 1948 and 1949, trying to find a solution agreeable to both India and Pakistan. It reported to the Security Council in August 1948 that "the presence of troops of Pakistan" inside Kashmir represented a "material change" in the situation. A two-part process was proposed for the withdrawal of forces. In the first part, Pakistan was to withdraw its forces as well as other Pakistani nationals from the state. In the second part, "when the Commission shall have notified the Government of India" that Pakistani withdrawal has been completed, India was to withdraw the bulk of its forces. After both the withdrawals were completed, a plebiscite would be held. The resolution was accepted by India but effectively rejected by Pakistan.

In short, India required an asymmetric treatment of the two countries in the withdrawal arrangements, regarding Pakistan as an `aggressor', whereas Pakistan insisted on parity. The UN mediators tended towards parity, which was not to India's satisfaction. In the end, no withdrawal was ever carried out, India insisting that Pakistan had to withdraw first, and Pakistan contending that there was no guarantee that India would withdraw afterwards. No agreement could be reached between the two countries on the process of demilitarisation.

Declassified British papers indicate that Britain and US had let their Cold War calculations influence their policy in the UN, disregarding the merits of the case.

17 October: the Indian Constituent Assembly adopts Article 370 of the Constitution, ensuring a special status and internal autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir, with Indian jurisdiction in Kashmir limited to the three areas agreed in the IOA, namely, defence, foreign affairs and communications.

Kashmir: History (1950)

 During the 1950s, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru held talks with Pakistan's Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra to sort out the plebiscite issue in Kashmir . The discussions between the two suggest that Nehru had even agreed to appoint a Plebiscite Administrator by April 1954. However, Pakistan then joined the CENTO alliance and India used this as a reason to reject the plebiscite and to cancel the talks.

However, in May 1955 Nehru held talks with Muhammad Ali Bogra during which he underlined his willingness to solve the Kashmir issue on the basis of a Partition of the state along the cease fire line.

Nehru's cable to Krishna Menon in 1957 suggests that he favored a 'readjustment' of the ceasefire line on strategic and geographic grounds. From the 1950s, India became lukewarm to the idea of a plebiscite and instead adopted the view that the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, which was elected in 1951, had ratified the state's accession to India therefore it was unnecessary to further determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

Kashmir: History (1951-1953) 

1951: Elections for the Constituent Assembly, with 75 seats allocated for the Indian administered part of Kashmir and 25 seats left reserved for the Pakistan administered part. National Conference wins all 75 seats in a rigged election. The UN passes a resolution to the effect that such elections do not substitute a plebiscite, because a plebiscite offers the option of choosing between India and Pakistan. Sheikh Abdullah wins, mostly unopposed.

1947-1952: Sheikh Abdullah drifts from a position of endorsing accession to India in 1947 to insisting on the self-determination of Kashmiris in 1952. In July 1952, he signs Delhi Agreement with the Central government on Centre-State relationship, providing for autonomy of the State within India and of regions within the State.

1953: In 1953, the governments of India and Pakistan agree to appoint a Plebiscite Administrator by the end of April 1954. Abdullah procrastinates in confirming the accession of Kashmir to India. In June 1953, Abdullah heads a subcommittee of the National Conference which recommends five options for the state's future, all involving a plebiscite or independence. The recommendations are opposed by three of Abdullah's five-member cabinet, including the Deputy Prime Minister Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. In August 1953, Abdullah is dismissed by Sadr-i-Riyasat Karan Singh and arrested. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed is appointed as the Prime Minister.

Kashmir: Two-Nation Theory

The British Raj in India consisted of two units, namely British India and Princely India; whereas the former was directly ruled, the latter enjoyed semi autonomous status. The Rulers of the Princely States were allies of the British and under different treaties they accepted the British Paramountcy.

Many Muslims of Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir are manipulated that because Pakistan was created in name of religion; and because Jammu and Kashmir was a majority Muslim State, therefore, it should have become part of Pakistan. That is not true; as Two Nations Theory did not apply to the Princely States, including the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Two Nations theory, ………..was only applicable to the British India. The Rulers of Princely States had a choice to accede to either India, accede to Pakistan or negotiate some new terms with India or Pakistan.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah was a constitutional expert. He knew the Two Nations Theory did not apply to the Princely States; and that is why before the establishment of Pakistan he never asked Kashmir.

When people asked Mohammed Ali Jinnah a question about future of Kashmir and other Princely States, he asserted:

“Constitutionally and legally, the Indian States will be independent sovereign states on the termination of Paramountcy and they will be free to decide for themselves to adopt any course they like. It is open to them to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly, the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, or decide to remain independent. In the last case, they enter into such arrangements or relationship with Hindustan or Pakistan as they may choose.”

Mohammed Ali Jinnah demonstrated this policy by accepting accession of Junagarrh’s to Pakistan, even though this State had overwhelming non Muslim majority; and if the Two Nations Theory was applicable to the Princely States then this State would have automatically become part of India. Similarly, on question of Hyderabad, Mohammed Ali Jinnah supported Ruler of this State’s right to remain independent, even though this State also had overwhelming non Muslim majority; and if the Two Nations Theory was applicable to the Princely States then Hyderabad also should have automatically joined India.

Apart from that Governor General of India Lord Louis Mountbatten in his address to a Special full meeting of the Chamber of Princes on July 25 1947, said:

“Now, the Indian Independence Act releases the States from all their obligations to the Crown. The States will have complete freedom- technically and legally they become independent.”ir’s inclusion in Pakistan.