Pramana Indian epistemology

 

Pramana (Sanskrit: प्रमाण; IAST: Pramāṇa) literally means "proof" and "means of knowledge".

 One of the core concepts in Indian epistemology, pramanas are one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge.

In Buddhist literature, pramāṇa is referred to as pramāṇavāda. 

Pramāṇa is also related to the Indian concept of yukti (Sanskrit: युक्ति) which means active application of epistemology or what one already knows, innovation, clever expedients or connections, methodological or reasoning trick, joining together, application of contrivance, means, method, novelty or device to more efficiently achieve a purpose.

Hinduism identifies six pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths: 

• Pratyakṣa (Perception) – direct sensory or yogic perception.
• Anumāna (Inference) – reasoning from cause to effect or general to particular.
• Upamāna (Comparison/Analogy) – knowing something by analogy (e.g., an unknown animal by comparing with a known one).
• Arthāpatti (Postulation/Presumption) – deriving an unseen fact to explain an observed contradiction (e.g., if a fat man never eats in the day, we infer he must eat at night).
• Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension/Absence) – knowledge from the absence of something (e.g., “There is no pot on the floor”).
• Śabda (Verbal Testimony) – reliable verbal authority, especially scriptures (Veda) or trustworthy persons.

1. Cārvāka (Materialist school)

Accepts: Only Pratyakṣa (Perception).

Rejects: All others — considers inference unreliable (since cause-effect cannot be universally guaranteed), scripture untrustworthy, and absence or presumption as imagination.

Basis: Empiricism and skepticism; distrust of metaphysics.

2. Vaiśeṣika (Atomist Realism)

Accepts: Pratyakṣa and Anumāna only.

Rejects: Upamāna (redundant), Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi (unnecessary, can be reduced to perception/inference), Śabda (treated under inference).

Basis: Ontological realism and logical minimalism — only perception and inference needed for atomistic metaphysics.

3.Nyāya (Logic school)

Accepts: Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda (4 pramāṇas).

Rejects: Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi as separate pramāṇas — considers them reducible to inference or perception.

Basis: Logical rigor — no need to multiply categories; all valid knowledge reducible to four.

4. Sāṃkhya

Accepts: Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda (3 pramāṇas).

Rejects: Upamāna (analogy not needed), Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi (subsumed under inference).

Basis: Dualistic metaphysics — inference and scripture are enough to know prakṛti and puruṣa; analogy/absence seen as unnecessary.

5.Yoga (Patañjali’s school)

Accepts: Same as Sāṃkhya — Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda (3 pramāṇas).

Rejects: Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi (not independent).

Basis: Practical orientation — three are sufficient for liberation.

6.Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (Ritual exegesis)

Prabhākara school: Accepts 5 pramāṇas – Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Śabda. Rejects Anupalabdhi (absence reducible to perception).

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa school: Accepts 6 pramāṇas – all six, including Anupalabdhi.

Basis: High emphasis on Vedic authority (Śabda is supreme); arthāpatti and anupalabdhi needed for ritual interpretation and logical consistency.

7.Vedānta (Uttara-Mīmāṃsā)

Advaita Vedānta: Accepts 6 pramāṇas (like Kumārila) – Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi, Śabda.

Viśiṣṭādvaita & Dvaita: Typically accept 3 pramāṇas – Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda.

Basis: Śabda (Upaniṣads) is ultimate in Vedānta; Advaita incorporates more pramāṇas to support subtle metaphysical arguments (e.g., Brahman and māyā).

8. Buddhism

Accepted:

Pratyakṣa (Perception) – direct, non-conceptual awareness of particulars.

Anumāna (Inference) – reasoning based on logical relations.

Rejected as independent pramāṇas:

Śabda (Verbal testimony) – not independent; only valid if reducible to perception or inference (e.g., a reliable teacher’s word is ultimately trusted because it can be inferred to be true, not because testimony itself is a separate pramāṇa).

Upamāna (Comparison) – seen as a form of inference.

Arthāpatti (Postulation/Presumption) – reducible to inference.

Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension/Absence) – treated as a kind of perception of absence, not an independent pramāṇa.

9. Jainism

Jain epistemology often frames knowledge as twofold:

Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) – can be sensory or extra-sensory (e.g., clairvoyance, omniscience of Tīrthaṅkaras).

Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) – includes inference and scripture/testimony.

In terms of the six Hindu pramāṇas:

Accepted:

Pratyakṣa (Perception)Anumāna (Inference)Śabda/Āgama (Verbal testimony) – authoritative especially when from omniscient beings (Jinas).

Rejected as independent:

Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi – considered reducible to perception or inference.